abstract
- © 2021 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.What motivates legislators to respond to citizen-initiated contacts about policy positions in party-centred systems with limited re-election incentives? We argue legislators are more responsive to individual citizens when they are being contacted about high-profile, salient policy issues, and when they have the relevant experience and staff resources to attend to individual requests. Using a field experiment where we email Mexican senators about their policy positions before casting eight different floor votes across nine months, we find substantial support for our argument. The article challenges the notion of re-election-based responsiveness by arguing that issue-visibility, access to individual resources, and personal political experience explain variation in communicative responsiveness in party-centred legislatures. Such findings hold critical implications for theories of democratic representation, suggesting the incentive to establish significant communicative relations with constituents does not only stem from incentives to cultivate a personal vote.